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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3406 
___________ 
 
IN RE: LORNA KELLAM, 
       Petitioner   
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus from the  
United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
(Related to D.C. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-00802) 
District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
December 10, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: January 15, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Lorna Kellam, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), has filed a 
petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court vacate the District Court’s 
order denying her IFP application and referring her case to the United States Bankruptcy 
Court.  For the following reasons, we will deny the requested relief. 
                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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  In September 2015, Kellam filed a motion to proceed IFP and a notice of removal 
before the District Court.  Although Kellam initially stated that she wanted the District 
Court to exercise jurisdiction over a state court action, her removal notice made clear that 
she sought to remove an action that was proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court.  Kellam’s motion to proceed IFP stated that her monthly income was $1400, and 
that her monthly expenses were $1106.50.   
 On September 21, 2015, the District Court issued an order that: (1) denied 
Kellam’s IFP motion based on her annual income; and (2) referred the matter to the 
United States Bankruptcy Court as related to In re: Lorna Kellam, Debtor, D. Del. Bankr. 
No. 15-11235-BLS based on the District Court’s Amended Standing Order of Reference.1  
Kellam then filed the current petition for a writ of mandamus.  She requests that this 
Court vacate the District Court’s order, which she states violated her rights.  
 Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in the most extraordinary situations.  
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).   As preconditions 
to the issuance of the writ, the petitioner must establish that the writ will not be used as a 
substitute for the regular appeals process, that there is no alternative remedy or other 
adequate means to obtain the relief desired, and that the right to relief is “clear and 
                                                          
1 The Amended Standing Order of Reference is based on 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), and in 
relevant part provides that “any or all cases under Title 11 and any or all proceedings 
arising under Title 11 or arising in or related to a case under Title 11 are referred to the 
bankruptcy judges for this district.”  
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indisputable.”  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996), superseded in part on 
other grounds by 3d Cir. L.A.R. 24.1(c).  Kellam’s petition does not meet these 
requirements.    
 First, the District Court has discretion to determine whether to grant IFP, see 
United States v. Holiday, 436 F.2d 1079, 1079 (3d Cir. 1971), and Kellam has made no 
argument that the District Court abused its discretion by determining that she was not 
eligible to proceed IFP due to her finances, see Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 
1084 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that leave to proceed IFP “is based on a showing of 
indigence”).  Second, Kellam has not demonstrated that the District Court abused its 
discretion by referring the case to the Bankruptcy Court as related to her proceedings 
before that court.  See In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The 
district courts’ power to refer is discretionary, but courts routinely refer most bankruptcy 
cases to the bankruptcy court.”) (quotation marks omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 157.  Kellam 
argues that the District Court’s referral to the Bankruptcy Court was improper because it 
was based on the denial of her IFP application and because the District Court did not 
engage in any fact finding.  These arguments do not establish a “clear and indisputable” 
right to relief, and instead represent a misreading of the order—which was based on the 
Amended Standing Order—and the law.  
 Kellam has thus not satisfied the standard for obtaining mandamus, and her 
petition is denied.   
